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INTRODUCTION 
Human communication has been, and is, one of the most 
complex phenomena investigated by psychologists. Even a casual 
observation of everyday conversation reveals that total 
misunderstanding can occur, even with full speech, when people's 
thoughts wander in different directions. One of the factors 
essential to the production of unintentional non-communication 
is the state of psychological functioning in each of the 
individual members of the communication dyad. As Vygotsky put 
it, "...those who are accustomed to solitary, independent 
thinking do not easily grasp another's thought and are very 
partial to their own..." (1962, pp. Ihl-lk2), 
The present investigation was a study of the human communi­
cation process. The central element in this investigation 
was the concept of "egocentrism" or, perhaps, the "egocentric 
predicament", which has been defined as the "...difficulty... 
of knowing things or persons as they are in themselves, as 
distinguished from the way one necessarily knows and experiences 
them through one's own personality" (English & English, 1958). 
Egocentrism and its effect upon behavior has been extensively 
discussed and investigated in infants and children, and a 
limited amount of related research has been carried out with 
adolescent and young adult populations. The present study was 
an extension of this research on egocentrism to aged adults. 
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specifically as it relates to social interactions in general 
and communication skills in particular. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A Brief Overview of Piaget's Theory of Intellectual Growth 
Before entering directly into the body of literature most 
pertinent to the present investigation, a brief summary of Jean 
Piaget's theory of intellectual development will be presented. 
Despite the fact that the major concern of this study had to 
do with certain cognitive abilities of young and old adults in 
social situations, much of the impetus for this research was 
derived from Piaget's theorizations about the growth of cogni­
tive abilities in children and adolescents. To expedite the 
reader's understanding of the discussion to follow, and to avoid 
unnecessary repetition, a broad outline of Piaget's theory will 
be presented at this time. Several key concepts also 
necessary for understanding the theory will be defined. A more 
definitive summary of Piaget's position can be found in Berlyne 
(1957), Flavell (1963), or Piaget (1967). 
Piaget's system is best viewed in the framework of genetic 
epistemology. Thus, the primary concern is the biology of 
knowing. How do the order and logic that characterize rational 
thought evolve? What is the genesis of the ability to appre­
hend the structures of science and mathematics? These are 
the questions underlying Piaget's life-long study of the 
origins of intellect. 
Piaget describes mental development as a process involv­
ing successive states of equilibrium: "It may be likened to 
the assembly of a subtle mechanism that goes through graduate 
phases of adjustment in which the individual pieces become 
more supple and mobile as the equilibrium of the mechanism as 
a whole becomes more stable" (Piaget, 1967, p. h), The 
equilibrative and complementary processes of accommodation and 
assimilation that regulate the transformations from one phase 
to the next are considered to be constant. In contrast, each 
phase of this adjustive process can be represented by a 
characteristic organizational structure or form. Piaget traces 
the evolution of these variant structures through stages of 
development extending from parturition to adolescence. At 
each successive stage the individual gains psychological 
distance in his encounters with reality. 
The first stage, called the "period of sensori-motor 
intelligence," deals with the construction of the logic of 
actions. Essentially, the process involves the organization 
of actions into operational patterns, or "schemata of actions," 
whose primary characteristics are to permit the infant to 
dissociate in his actions between means and ends. Through the 
dual process of accommodation to the environment and assimila­
tion of the information gained, the infant gradually recognizes 
the permanence of objects. 
The second stage, labeled "preoperational," witnesses the 
appearance of symbolic function, which includes the development 
of language. The integration of symbols allows the child to 
expand his range of operations; thus, from a response to an 
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event, intelligence is mediated through language. However, 
the child is not yet able to represent mentally abstractions 
that lead to ideas whose meanings are constant. These constan­
cies have to do with aspects of the "objective world," such 
as substance, measure, motion, and logical categories. In 
this preoperational world everything appears to be related to 
the child's own point of view ("jegocentrism"). 
In the following stage, extending from about the age of 
seven to the age of 11 or 12, the child constructs a world that 
is increasingly ordered and rational. This period is charac­
terized by the development of "concrete operations." The child 
now no longer thinks only in terms of himself, but he also takes 
into account the limitations that the external, "concrete" 
world places upon him. Piaget's experiments permit him to 
describe the child's thought in terms of reversible logical 
structures and systems involving such operations as inversion, 
reciprocity, and multiplication. Nevertheless, thinking remains 
closely linked to manipulative actions with tangible, "concrete" 
objects: classifying them, putting them in series, or putting 
them in one-to-one correspondence. In essence, the child's 
world at this stage is concerned with necessary relations 
among objects. 
The final stage of intellectual development, "formal 
operations," deals with the construction of an abstract 
("formal") logic that is applicable to any kind of content. 
Thus, the adolescent can apprehend not only necessary relations 
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among objects and events, but also possible and impossible 
relations. He can imagine things that never were (e.g., a 
unicorn, a female president of the United States) and ask 
"Why not?" The adolescent is no longer directed only by con­
crete relations; he can make hypotheses and elaborate theories. 
He can dissociate the form of his thinking from its content. 
Piaget's is a theory of subject-object equilibration. 
His view is that mental growth is governed by continual 
activity aimed at balancing the intrusions of the physical and 
social environment with the individual's need to conserve his 
existing mental structural systems. 
The Concept of Egocentrism 
A central concept in cognitive developmental psychology is 
that of egocentrism. This term does not refer to preoccupation 
with the self, but rather it implies that egocentric behavior 
stems from a limited awareness of the self. The essential 
meaning of egocentrism is an embeddedness in one's own point 
of view. As Church (1961) pointed out, in infancy this implies 
a complete absence of awareness that one has a point of view 
rather than an instantaneous, exhaustive, and infallible grasp 
of reality. This is not to imply that the child has no 
experience of himself, but rather that he does not experience 
himself experiencing. 
Piaget (1950; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) has placed the 
egocentrism concept in a central role in his theory of 
7 
intellectual development. Roughly speaking, this development 
is said to consist of the passage from an initial state of 
total egocentrism to a final state of total objectivity. As 
the individual matures he becomes more and more capable of 
discriminating subject from object in subject-object 
interactions (Piaget, 1962). At each stage of mental develop­
ment this lack of discrimination, or differentiation, takes 
on a unique form and results in a unique set of behaviors. 
The following briefly summarizes Inhelder and Piaget's (1958) 
description of this succession of changes: 
(1) At the sensori-motor level the child confuses his 
own activity with that of the external world. The developmental 
landmark of this stage, which occurs as this primitive form 
of egocentrism recedes, is the practical dissociation of 
these poles and the consequent formation of the object concept. 
(2) The appearance of symbolic thinking brings back 
egocentrism which had once been overcome in the sensori-motor 
period. At this time there exists a lack of differentiation 
between the child's own viewpoint and that of other persons. 
The egocentrism of this stage seems to be very similar to the 
"self-differentiation" concept of Murphy (1937) and the notion 
of "assumption of similarity" as described by Gage, Leavitt, 
and Stone (1956). These writers were concerned primarily with 
studies of empathie ability, and they underscored the apparent 
inability of three-year-old children to differentiate themselves 
from other persons. 
8 
(3) The appearance of the reflective processes specific 
to formal thinking activates a third type of egocentrism by 
which the child is unable to differentiate his own perspective 
from that of the social milieu to which he must adapt. At 
this time the child must learn to think productively on a 
strict reality basis and to develop a genuine social reciproc­
ity, This stage is said to last throughout adolescence; 
perfectly objective, totally non-egocentric thinking is 
achieved at this time. Elkind (196?) has discussed the 
phenomenon of adolescent egocentrism at length. 
As can be inferred from the above discussion, the transi­
tion from one form of egocentrism to another takes place in 
a dialectic fashion in such a manner that the cognitive 
structures that free the child from a lower form of egocentrism 
are the same structures that entangle him in a higher egocentric 
form. From the developmental point of view it would seem 
legitimate to regard egocentrism as a negative by-product of 
any emergent mental system, for it produces a new set of 
unrealistic, non-objective representations of the world at 
each newly-achieved level of thought. 
Related- to the egocentrism construct is the phenomenon of 
"centering", or "centration." This process refers to the 
child's tendency to center his attention on one detail of 
an object or event. Piaget (1950) placed heavy emphasis on 
the child's inability to "decenter", i.e., his inability to 
shift his attention from only one aspect of an object or an 
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event. By neglecting other important aspects of a stimulus 
array, the child's reasoning is distorted. The inability to 
decenter appears to be most characteristic of the preopera­
tional child. The individual at this stage seems to be confined 
to the surface aspects of the phenomena he tries to think 
about, and thereby he assimilates only those superficial 
features which dominate his perceptual field. For example, in 
the water-level problem, which is used to test the child's 
understanding of the invariant qualities of substance, he will 
center either on the height of the container (and therefore 
say that the taller one is larger) or perhaps the width (and 
that the wider one is larger). What the child characteristi­
cally fails to do is decenter by considering both height and 
width simultaneously, which would allow him to relate the 
changes in one of these dimensions to compensatory changes 
in the other. 
To summarize, decentering refers to development from 
passive, "best" form-dominated perception, typical of the 
young child, to active, operation-directed perception of the 
older child and adult. This concept appears to be similar 
to the "reasonable reorientation" hypothesis of Wertheimer 
(1961). This was described as "...reorientation which enables 
the subject to view the given situation in a new and more 
penetrating perspective" (Wertheimer, 196I, p. 170). 
In his extensive empirical investigations of the Piagetian 
tasks, Elkind rather exhaustively studied the decentering 
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phenomenon (Elkind & Scott, 1962). Nursery and elementary 
school children were tested with a set of ambiguous pictures. 
Success in perceiving these ambiguous pictures (which, in 
this task, revealed the ability to decenter) increased signifi­
cantly with age, articulation of pictures, and IQ. 
Ability to decenter also has been studied as a function 
of several other variables. Confirming the results of Elkind 
and Scott (1962), success in decentering has been shown to 
correlate positively with age (Houssiadas & Brown, 1967; 
Stuart, 1967; Sullivan & Hunt, 1967) and intelligence level 
(Stuart, 1967; Sullivan & Hunt, 1967). Other positivé relation­
ships with decentering ability have been found with these 
variables: the ability to make mature moral and causal judgments 
(Stuart, 1967); social class (Sullivan & Hunt, 1967); categori­
zation ability (Weinberg, 1959, 1963). Houssiadas and Brown 
(1967) found that the developmental sequence for centering-
decentering found in normal children also exists in mentally 
retarded children (mean IQ = 55j ages 8 to 1^ years). 
At this point one might reasonably ask the question: 
How is this childish egocentrism overcome? In what way does 
the growing individual achieve the ability to decenter his 
perceptions? As research has demonstrated, the child becomes 
more and more able to differentiate himself from his external 
world and to assimilate features of his environment other than 
those most perceptually dominant. No longer do pronouncements 
of "increasing maturity" provide satisfactory explanations for 
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these age-related changes. In search for a more satisfactory 
explanation of this diminution of childhood egocentricity, 
Flavell (1963) had this to say: 
There are ...other difficulties which derive 
directly from the child's egocentrism. First, 
the child — lacking other-role orientation — 
feels neither the compunction to justify his 
reasonings to others nor to look for possible 
contradictions in his logic. And causally 
related to this, he finds it exceedingly 
difficult to treat his own thought processes 
as an object of thought.... One of Piaget's 
firmest beliefs...is that thought becomes aware 
of itself, able to justify itself, and in 
general able to adhere to logical-social norms 
of noncontradiction, coherence, etc., and that 
all these things and more can emerge only from 
repeated interpersonal interactions....It is 
social interaction which gives the ultimate 
COUP de grace to childish egocentrism (pp. 156-157)• 
Egocentrism and Social Interaction 
Theoretical background 
Piaget (1928, 1950) has suggested that egocentrism taints 
the child's efforts in virtually all spheres of activity. He 
has written extensively about various kinds of childhood 
functioning which reveal the effects of this pervasive 
egocentric cast of mind. Examples would include the child's 
primitive conceptions of the physical world (artificialism, 
animism), representations of objects and space, attitudes about 
moral-ethical phenomena, and interpersonal activities which 
require role-taking ability (including verbal ability). But 
as the child grows older, he gains facility in various 
cognitive skills; these cognitive changes imply a decline in 
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egocentricity of thought, 
Piaget (1950) has argued that, in addition to the effects 
of maturation of biologically programmed "structures," the 
child gains new cognitive skills because of his increasing 
interaction with his social environment, "The human being 
is immersed right from birth in a social environment which 
affects him Just as much as his physical environment. Society, 
even more, in a sense, than the physical environment, changes 
the very structure of the individual, because it not only 
compels him to recognize facts, but also provides him with a 
ready-made system of signs, which modify his thought" 
(Piaget, 1950, p. 156). The decline of egocentrism (particu­
larly after age seven or eight) is therefore believed to result, 
in large part, from reinforcements (including negative ones) 
issuing from interactions with peers. According to Flavell 
(1963), 
...social interaction is the principal 
liberating factor, particularly social 
interaction with peers. In the course 
of his contacts (and especially, his 
conflicts and arguments) with other 
children, the child increasingly finds 
himself forced to reexamine his own 
percepts and concepts in the light of 
those of others, and by so doing, gradually 
rids himself of cognitive egocentrism 
(p. 279). 
Piaget (1928) put it this way: 
' What then gives rise to the need for verifica­
tion? Surely it must be the shock of our 
thought coming into contact with that of 
others, which produces doubt and the desire 
to prove....The social need to share the 
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thought of others and to communicate our 
own with success is at the root of our 
need for verification. Proof is the out­
come of argument....Logical reasoning is 
an argument which we have with ourselves, 
and which reproduces internally the features 
of a real argument (p. 2O40. 
Peffer and his colleagues (Feffer, 1959j 1967; Feffer 
& Gourevitch, I960; Feffer & Suchotliff, 1966) have proposed, 
that the decenterine concept provides continuity between the 
general aspect of internal cognitive organization and the 
cognitive structuring of social content. In other words, this 
extension of the decentering concept to interpersonal behavior 
rests on the assumption that the same processes are Involved 
in both impersonal cognition (person to object) and inter­
personal cognition (person to person). Furthermore, according 
to Feffer, this decentering interpretation also can be applied 
to the structuring of interpersonal events at different levels 
of cognitive maturity. The argument runs as follows: The 
dovetailing of responses involved in effective social inter­
action demands that each participant modify his intended 
behavior in. anticipation of the other's reaction to this 
behavior. In order to anticipate accurately this reaction, 
one must be able to see his intended behavior from the 
perspective of the other person, but at the same time he must 
also view his intended action from his own perspective. The 
cognitive organization of an individual capable of effective 
social interaction can be interpreted as one in which different 
perspectives are considered simultaneously in relation to each 
other such that the distortion engendered by a given viewpoint 
(or centering) is equilibrated or corrected by another per­
spective. In contrast, persons who are able only to focus 
sequentially upon their behavior from a single perspective 
at a time should have difficulty in effectively modifying their 
responses. It is in this light, according to Feffer, that the 
decentering concept provides continuity between the general 
aspect of internal cognitive organization and the cognitive 
structuring of social content. With regard to the young child, 
therefore, Piaget (1950) underscored Ineffectual social 
communication in the following way: 
...however dependent he may be on surrounding 
intellectual influence, the young child 
assimilates them in his own way. He reduces 
them to his point of view and therefore 
distorts them without realizing it, simply 
because he cannot yet distinguish his point 
of view from that of others through failure 
to coordinate or "group" the points of view. 
Thus, both on the social and on the physical 
plane, he is egocentric through ignorance of 
his own subjectivity (p, 160). 
These theoretical notions have generated a spate of 
empirical investigations. The categorical names under which 
these research efforts fall include studies of empathie ability, 
role-taking skills, and verbal communication effectiveness, 
to name a few. In an early review of the role-taking skills 
literature, Sarbin (195^) attempted to identify the essential 
elements in interpersonal behavioral phenomena. In accordance 
with Piaget and others, Sarbin concluded that the essential 
ingredient in any sort of skill sequence in role-taking seems 
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to be a process by which the individual somehow cognizes, 
apprehends, grasps, or whatever, certain attributes of another 
individual. Of necessity these must be inferential attributes 
(rather than directly perceptible attributes): needs, inten­
tions, opinions, capacities, limitations, and so on. Sarbin 
proposed that the estimate of these attributes formed by the 
role taker or the effective communicator must be a synthesis 
of two sources of information: (a) knowledge of people and 
their behavior in various situations, and (b) perceptual input 
from the overt behavior of the other person or from other cue 
sources in the immediate situation. In a more recent analysis, 
Krauss and Glucksberg (1969) essentially concurred on the 
importance of these informational sources, Roger Brown (1965), 
in his encoding-decoding analysis of interpersonal communica­
tion, insisted that the ability to control a lexicon and a 
grammar of language is a third essential requirement. 
Empirical investigations of interpersonal skills 
With this theoretical framework thus established, a number 
of representative empirical studies now will be reviewed. 
Elkind (1961) replicated an early Piagetian study of 
children's relational concepts, i.e., concepts whose very 
meaning seems to imply the notion of differing viewpoints. 
Analyzing children's notions of right and left, Elkind distin­
guished three rough levels of understanding: (a) At the initial 
level the child can accurately identify his own right and left 
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arms and legs "but not those of the examiner facing him; 
(b) At the second level he masters the first problem, but he 
still retains the notion that right and left are inherent 
properties of objects, rather than pure relations which hold 
only between objects from some particular point of view; 
(c) The child at the third level of understanding holds a 
completely differentiated and abstract conception of these 
relational terms. Elkind assumed that these levels reflect 
the underlying development from egocentrism to role-taking 
disposition and skill. 
Burns and Cavey (1957) investigated the empathie ability 
of nursery school children. Using a set of pictures of various 
facial expressions as stimulus materials, they found that the 
number of empathie responses given by younger subjects (ages 
three to five years) were significantly lower than those given 
by older subjects (ages five to six-and-a-half). In a some­
what similar study of empathic-like abilities, Flapan (1968) 
examined children's ability to perceive or to make inferences 
about feelings, thoughts, and intentions, and to interpret or 
explain sequences of behavior that occur in interpersonal 
relationships. He found that ages six to nine years appear to 
represent a transitional developmental stage with regard to 
these kinds of skills. This conclusion is in accord with many 
other studies of cognitive changes; the seventh year of life, 
give or take a couple of years, appears to be the year of the 
"cognitive revolution." 
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Cowan (1966) has devised an ingenious procedure to study 
the effects of egocentric thinking in social interaction 
situations. From an adaptation of Piaget's "three mountain 
problem" (the child must select from an array of photographs 
the view "seen" by a doll positioned at a particular orienta­
tion to a three-dimensional display) a measure of cognitive 
egocentrism is obtained for each child. On the basis of these 
egocentrism scores subjects are paired together in three ways: 
Hi-Hi pairs (both subjects scored high, i.e., they displayed 
little egocentricity on the first task), Lo-Lo pairs (both 
received low scores on the first task), and Hi-Lo pairs. 
The two subjects are then seated back-to-back at small tables. 
On each table top is an identical four-by-four matrix arrange­
ment, with the top eight squares colored yellow and the bottom 
eight squares colored red. Each subject is then given an 
identical set of 16 objects — circles, squares, small toys, 
etc. The children are told not to turn around. The children 
are told to place their objects, one at a time, one in each 
square, so that their boards would end up looking the same 
("the same" is not defined). From this task can be derived 
measures of communication efficiency (how well the task was 
performed), egocentric language, and descriptions of the 
properties of the system of communication developed by the 
two participants. In the two studies using this technique 
that Cowan has reported thus far (1966, 1967), the Hi-Hi 
pairs (children with low egocentrism scores) performed in a 
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manner far superior to the other two kinds of pairings: 
communication was more efficient, little egocentric language 
was evidenced, and usually very effective forms of communica­
tion patterns were established. The Hi-Lo pairs also tended 
to perform far better than the Lo-Lo pairs. Cowan (196?) has 
also reported that a slight sex difference was evident among 
his subjects (female pairs did better than male pairs), and 
that middle- and upper-class children performed better than 
lower class children. Cowan has concluded that these data 
suggest that Piaget's concept of egocentric language provides 
a useful conceptual tool for analyzing the link between the 
structural properties of the individual child and the formal 
properties of his social interaction. 
A number of other studies have employed procedures similar 
to those of Cowan. For example, Alvy (1968) tested six, eight, 
and 11-year olds on a verbal communication task where success 
was assumed to be a function of the ability to take each other's 
viewpoint. The members of a pair were separated by an opaque 
screen; one subject had to select from a set of pictures the 
one being described to him by the other child. Two main 
differences were found as a function of age: decreases in 
egocentric communications and increases in verbal exchange. 
Cohen and Klein (1968), in a similar study, obtained similar 
results. 
An extensive program of research on role-taking and 
communication skills in children has been conducted by John 
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Flavell and associates (Flavell, 1966; Flavell, Beach, & 
Chimsky, 1966; Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968). 
This research has systematically confirmed and extended Piaget's 
(1926) studies of social communication in children. Most of 
these studies involved some variation of a basic procedure in 
which different-aged children are presented with tasks 
requiring an ability to shift perspectives. Their principal 
finding was an indication that young children, when speaking, 
confuse their own perspective with that of the auditor in 
communication situations. This confusion was found to decline 
regularly with age in the period from six to nine years. This,, 
of course, is in complete agreement with the studies described 
earlier. 
Fry (1966), one of Flavell's associates, applied an 
encoding-decoding analysis to the transcriptions of the communi­
cation which occurred in his investigation. Presumably, Fry 
reasoned, as children get older they should be able to monitor 
their own communications to others at a cognitive level so as 
to make them more readily decodable by the particular listener. 
His data, obtained from subjects aged five to 15 years, 
confirmed this hypothesis. Additionally, the data indicated 
that children become increasingly adept with age at perceiving 
that someone else's point of view may differ considerably from 
one's own, 
Krauss and Glucksberg (see Glucksberg, Krauss, & Weisberg, 
1966) have developed another procedure for studying referential 
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communication, which they call the "Stack the Blocks" game. 
Two persons are seated on opposite sides of an opaque screen 
so that neither can see the other. Each is given a duplicate 
set of six wooden blocks; each block has a novel design 
stamped on one side. The blocks have holes drilled through 
them so that they can be stacked on an upright wooden peg. 
One person in the pair is randomly designated the "speaker" 
and the other becomes the "listener," The object of the game 
is to build two matching stacks of blocks, with the "speaker" 
providing the "listener" all the instructions. It was found 
that this procedure could be employed over a wide age range 
(nursery school children through adults). The major finding, 
obtained from a series of studies, was that pairs of nursery 
school children were unable to converge upon a shared nomen­
clature for these novel forms (Glucksberg, Krauss, & Weisberg, 
1966), while college adult subjects were able to develop 
standardized nomenclatures fairly easily (Krauss & Weinheimer, 
1964a, 196^-b). The children's difficulty seemed to stem from 
their use of reference phrases which were idiosyncratic and 
not descriptive of the forms. They tended to use private 
imagery rather than conventional or socially shared forms. 
However, when the novel graphic forms were replaced with famil­
iar figures (such as animals), the children performed almost 
error-free (Krauss, 1968). 
Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of the work 
of Krauss and Glucksberg has been the extension of the analysis 
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of communications skills into the adult years, A recent study 
demonstrated the high utility of their procedure for comparing 
variously-aged subjects (Krauss & Glucksberg, 1969). 
It should be noted in passing that Maclay and Newman 
(i960) devised a similar task for adult subjects which antedates 
that of Krauss and Glucksberg. Their method required one 
subject to describe a picture to a listener seated behind a 
screen so that the latter could identify it from a number of 
pictures before him. The results suggested that normal adult 
communicators are likely to show a fair amount of sensitivity 
to the listener's apparent input needs, augmenting their 
messages whenever they have information (such as negative feed­
back) which suggests that these needs are high. 
Feffer (1959) has extended the concept of decentering 
activity to an analysis of the cognitive structuring of social 
content as revealed in role-taking activities. The Role 
Taking Task (RTT) was specifically designed by Feffer to relate 
decentering to the interpersonal domain. The RTT is a 
projective task derived from the Make-a-Picture-Story task, 
which requires the subject make up initial stories for a number 
of ambiguous scenes. After the stories are completed, each 
scene is presented again, and the subject is asked to retell 
the initial story from the viewpoint of each of his characters. 
Evaluation is based upon the degree to which the subject is 
able to refocus upon his initial story from the perspectives 
of his characters, while at the same time maintaining 
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continuity between his various versions of the initial story. 
The underlying assumption is that the change and continuity 
which define successful role-taking performances are indica­
tive of the subject's ability to consider his behavior, 
simultaneously from differing viewpoints. Thus, a subtle 
degree of coordination among versions of the initial story is 
interpreted as a type of decentering which is simultaneously 
regulated by previous and anticipated centerings; in contrast, 
inconsistency or discontinuity among the characters' 
perspectives is interpreted as a form of sequential decentering. 
Feffer and Gourevitch (I960) gave children of various 
chronological ages the RTT and a series of impersonal cognitive 
tasks developed by Piaget, They found that a developmental 
ordering of role-taking behavior in terms of the decentering 
concept showed an expected progression with age as well as the 
expected correlations with the independent assessments of 
decentering ability on the impersonal cognitive tasks. A later 
study (Feffer & Suchotliff, 1966) used the RTT scores as a 
basis for pairing college adult subjects for a social inter­
action task. This latter task was a Password-type game in 
which each member of the pair was required to communicate test 
words via one-word association clues to his partner, who did 
not know the words. The higher RTT-scoring pairs communicated 
words more quickly and with fewer clues than did the lower RTT-
scoring pairs. (It is of interest to the present study that 
control procedures revealed that neither verbal fluency nor 
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WAIS Vocabulary scores were significantly related to either 
RTT or Password measures.) 
As discussed previously, it has been suggested that the 
decentering concept provides a conceptual tool for bridging 
cognitive structuring between impersonal and interpersonal 
situations. The studies just discussed gave support to this 
notion. However, one bit of dissonant evidence came from a 
study by Sullivan and Hunt (1967). They found that scores on 
the RTT and a modification of Piaget's "three mountain problem" 
correlated only ,26 for their seven-year-old sample, .03 at 
the nine-year-old level, and .4-1 for subjects aged 11. It is 
possible that these tasks, at least as employed by Sullivan 
and Hunt, are not quantitatively comparable. 
Egocentric speech and social interaction 
Another important feature in the literature on communica­
tive skills and social interaction is that of "egocentric 
speech" (or "private speech"). Apparently the first appearance 
of the term "egocentric speech" was in the book The Language 
and Thought of the Child, authored by Jean Piaget (1926). 
In this book Piaget described a series of quasi-experimental 
studies of social communication with his three young children. 
His general procedure was to explain something to one child 
and then ask that child to explain it to another. One example 
he used was the operation of an ordinary water tap. He found 
that a seven-year-old could understand this operation 
completely but could not communicate it to another. Piaget 
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attributed this lack of communication skill to egocentrism» 
In the same book Piaget also described his observations 
of children's spontaneous speech productions. He categorized 
these recorded utterances into two major classes (and, as is 
his wont, into several subclasses within each major class). 
"Egocentric speech" is speech which, whether uttered in 
solitude or in the presence of others, is judged to lack a 
primary communicative aim» There seems to be no attempt on 
the part of the child to take the role of the listener and 
hence to adapt the message to the listener's informational 
needs or input capacity. Indeed, as Piaget emphasized, there 
is no attempt even to make sure the listener is listening. 
"Socialized speech," on the other hand, applies to utterances 
which do seem to possess a genuine communicative orientation. 
This communication is characterized by the child's very real 
attempts to inform the listener, to persuade or coerce him to 
some course of action, and so on. 
Werner and Kaplan (1963) have also discussed the function 
of the speech of young children. Similar to Piaget's 
distinction between egocentric and socialized speech, Werner 
and Kaplan drew a distinction between "inner" and "external" 
speech; 
...the distinction between inner and external 
speech is relatively slight: speech for the 
self and speech for the other are little 
differentiated from one another. In the older 
child and in the normal adult...the differenti­
ation between speech for the self and speech 
for others becomes progressively more marked (p. 
328). 
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Piaget (1926) Judged that about 50 percent of the utter­
ances of children between the ages of five and six could be 
classed as egocentric rather than socialized. The supposedly 
high prevalence of this type of speech became a point of 
contention rather quickly. Researchers at the University of 
Minnesota's Institute of Child Welfare called to question the 
frequency of egocentric speech (Davis, 1937; McCarthy, 1930, 
195^). Based upon their naturalistic studies, they supplied 
evidence indicating that only two or three percent of the 
spontaneous utterances of preschool children could be 
classified as egocentric. However, many other researchers 
also observed children's speech in naturalistic settings, and 
their data supported Piaget's observations. These latter 
studies included both observations of children in free peer 
settings (Katz & Katz, 1928; Smith, 1935; Vygotsky & Luria, 
1930) and of children alone (Klein, 1963; Weir, 1962), The 
most recent confirmatory evidence came from Kohlberg, Yaeger, 
and Hjertholm (1968), They found a substantial amount of 
egocentric speech among preschool children, and in further 
agreement with Piaget, they found this form of speech to decline 
with age (it was practically absent in ten-year-olds). The 
percentages of egocentric speech they reported for younger 
children were not nearly as high as Piaget's 50 percent, but 
they were still substantially high. 
Certain other persons have agreed with Piaget's claims 
regarding the frequency of this phenomenon, but they have found 
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reason to dispute his explanation of the phenomenon. Vygotsky 
(1962)1 did not agree that private speech reveals a "presocial" 
lack of intent to communicate or an egocentric lack of aware­
ness of the auditor's perspective. He claimed that the failure 
to communicate is due to the fact that egocentric speech has a 
different function than social communication, and that is the 
function of cognitive self-guidance. In other words, according 
to Vygotsky, the child cannot think in a purely covert fashion, 
as can the older child or the adult; the child must sometimes 
"think out loud", to make concrete his thoughts in order to 
guide his actions. The age decline in self-directing egocentric 
speech, therefore, indicates that it:.has "gone underground" as 
verbal thought, rather than that presocial speech has been 
replaced by a more socially communicative form of speech. 
Kohlberg, Yaeger, and Hjertholm (1968), somewhat analogously 
to Vygotsky, objected to Piaget's conception of egocentric 
speech in that they felt he did not clearly distinguish between 
the contributions of the defects of social and of cognitive 
skill to the production of private speech. 
Elkind (1967) also suggested that Piaget's explanation 
might not be the most satisfactory one, Elkind noted, for 
example, that when explaining a piece of apparatus to another 
child, a young child uses many indefinite terms and leaves 
out important information. Instead of assuming that this is 
explained by saying that the child'falls to take the other 
^It is well to recognize that this-publication of Vygotsky's 
was written nearly 40 years ago. 
27 
person's point of view, Elkind suggested that this might be 
better explained by saying that the child assumes words 
carry much more information than they actually do. This 
results from the child's belief that even the indefinite 
"thing" in some way conveys the properties of the object 
which it represents. In other words, "the egocentrism of this 
period consists in a lack of clear differentiation between 
symbols and their referents" (Elkind, 1967, p. 1027). 
Studies of communication skills in adults 
As is the case for many forms of psychological function­
ing, egocentrism has been little studied in adults. A few 
studies, however, can be interpreted in the egocentrism-social 
interaction framework employed in this review. Schneidman 
and Farberow (1957) systematically investigated suicide cases 
of both the successful and unsuccessful varieties. They asked 
psychologists who study language to separate genuine suicide 
notes from simulated ones (written by non-suicidal types 
asked specifically to write suicide notes). This separation 
was accomplished very easily. It seemed that the pretender 
did not always write to the point of view of his supposed 
addressee, and this easily gave him away. Schneidman and. 
Farberow provided as one example the note written by a man 
instructed to write to his wife. This pretender explained 
that "I am disappointed with my job at General Motors" and 
that "I hate to leave our son John." This man seemed to be 
writing to the informational requirements of the psychologists 
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to be reading these notes, not to his soon-to-be-bereaved wife. 
Werner and Kaplan (1963) conducted an investigation in 
which adult subjects were instructed to write two sets of 
descriptions of novel drawings to be used at a future time. 
One set was written for the subject's own use, and the other 
was written by the subject to be used by someone else. The 
former descriptions were about half as long as the latter. 
It was apparent that the subject was addressing himself to 
two different sets of informational requirements. For himself 
he could be more brief and could perhaps make reference to 
idiosyncratic experience. This factor seems to be revealed in 
the common occurrence of an undergraduate asking to borrow the 
lecture notes of another. The frequent reply of the lender 
in this situation is, "You can borrow them, but I don't think 
you'll be able to get much out of them." 
A recent experiment (Krauss, Vivekananthan, & Weinheimer, 
1968) was similar to that of Kaplan's. College students 
were engaged in a color coding task; coding was done both 
for personal use and for the use of others. An analysis of 
the products revealed that the nonsocial coding condition 
produced more low frequency (unusual) words than the social 
condition. 
Soskin and John (1963) analyzed a series of ordinary 
adult conversations. Their data suggested that private speech 
is a rare or useless category of adult speech. It is to be 
noted, however, that no systematic studies of private speech 
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in the adult years have "been carried out* 
To close this discussion of egocentrism and social 
interaction, particularly as this topic pertains to adults, 
the following observation by Piaget seems most appropriate: 
' There is no reason to believe that cognitive 
egocentrism, marked by unconscious preferential 
focusing, or by a lack of differentiation of 
viewpoints, has no application to the field of 
interpersonal relations, in particular those 
which are expressed in language. To take an 
example from adult life, every beginning 
instructor discovers sooner or later that his 
first lectures were incomprehensible because 
he.was talking to himself, so to say, mindful 
only of his own point of view. He realizes 
only gradually and with difficulty that it is 
not easy to place oneself in the shoes of 
students who do not yet know what he knows 
about the subject matter of the course (Piaget, 
1962, p. 5). 
Egocentrism and Aged Adults 
Is egocentrism a useful construct in describing and 
explaining the behavior of adults beyond the flush of youth 
and middle age? Although the underlying mechanisms are not 
at all well understood, it has been well documented that in 
old age many kinds of interest and performance changes occur 
(see, for example, Birren, 196^, and Botwinick, 1967). How 
are these changes to be accounted for? 
In the Piagetian theory of intellectual development it 
is assumed that egocentrism recedes with the acquisition of 
formal operational characteristics of thought by the early or 
mid teens. However, it must be recognized that Piaget has not 
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concerned himself with adult modes of thinking; he assumes, 
apparently, that all the important cognitive developments of 
person's life have taken place by around the fifteenth year. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing literature documenting 
quite conclusively that significant intellectual changes do 
occur in later life. Some abilities seem to undergo sharp 
declines, while others are maintained or perhaps even improved. 
As yet there is no theory extant which is able to provide a 
convincing account for these changes. 
Several years ago Wayne Dennis (19^8, 1949) was led to 
hypothesize that with the onset of old age there occurs a 
regression to child-like concepts. While the regression 
hypothesis has not been a popular one, Dennis' data, particu­
larly that on animistic thought in elderly people, certainly 
were suggestive of such a process. 
There has been very little research on Piagetian tasks 
with adults and older persons. This undoubtedly is due, at 
least in part, to the prevailing notion that the kinds of 
mental processes Piaget is most concerned with are invariant 
and irreversible. Other than the work of Dennis mentioned 
before, just a few bits of Piagetian-adult research have been 
reported in the literature. Piaget and Inhelder (1962) men­
tioned briefly in the preface to their French-edition book 
a study in Geneva by de AJuriaguerra, Miiller, and Mandl. 
These investigators gave a series of the traditional conserva­
tion tasks (number, substance, etc.) to a group of "seniles" 
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and found evidence that these abilities disintegrate in 
reverse order of their formation in childhood. Another study, 
at the University of Montreal, found a striking decrement in 
performance on a conservation-of-surface task in an aged 
group, as compared with two groups of younger adults (Sanders, 
Laurendeau, & Bergeron, 1966). 
Following from the discussion earlier in this review, 
it is proposed that one underlying construct to account for 
poor performance in these kinds of tasks is that of egocentrism, 
or the inability to effectively decenter one's thoughts and 
perceptions. The concept of egocentrism, however, at least 
in the Genevan sense of the word, is simply not to be found in 
the literature on maturity and old age. A perusal of the 
indexes of all available texts and other sorts of compendia 
on old age by the present author revealed only a single 
reference to "egocentrism," Cameron (1967) investigated the 
relationship between "introversion" and "egocentrism" among 
the aged, but his definition of the latter concept was "having 
to do with one's wants and needs" (p. ^ 65), which is a meaning 
quite different than that employed by child psychologists. 
One concept which is often discussed with regard to old 
age, and which may be similar to the egocentrism concept, 
is that of rigidity. Unfortunately, the many different writers 
who have employed the term "rigidity" all seemed to have been 
using a somewhat different definition. The result has been a 
confusing array of research methodologies and data 
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interpretations. Of the population of definitions of 
rigidity, the following is a representative sample; the 
inability to change one's set when the objective conditions 
demand it (Rokeach, 19^8); a restricted range of behavior 
(Wolpert, 1955); adherence to present performance in an 
inadequate way (Goldstein, 19^3) j the presence of sti-ong 
boundaries between mental functions (Lewinian theory; e.g., 
Kounin, 19^1); a lack of change of behavior, where a change 
is necessary for success at the task, and where the subject 
knows that a change is likely to be demanded (Chown, 1961); 
a tendency to perseverate and resist conceptual change, to 
resist acquisition of new patterns of behavior, to refuse to 
relinquish old and established behavior patterns (Schaie, 1958). 
The typical research procedure for studying rigidity in 
old adults has been to administer some sort of test of rigidity 
(such as the Test of Behavioral Rigidity; Schaie, 1955) and 
obtain correlations with various kinds of problem-solving 
tasks. As Chown (1961) pointed out, however, there are over 
50 tests that have been used by different investigators as 
measures of rigidity. The relationship among these tests is 
largely unknown. 
Seemingly there might be a relationship between the 
concepts of rigidity and egocentrism. For example, in one 
report of a study of rigidity and problem solving in the aged 
the following observation was made: "Overcoming the influence 
of a problem-solving set involves the ability to change one's 
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approach or point of view" (Heglin, 1956)• This sounds very 
much like the operation of the decentering process, which is 
essential to the overcoming of childhood egocentrism. Yet 
this remains a verbal link; no empirical link between 
rigidity and egocentrism exists at the present time. Until a 
consensus is reached on the delineation of the rigidity 
construct, and until more comparable research methodologies 
are used in the investigation of "rigid" behaviors of the 
elderly, little fruit is likely to be gained from this particu­
lar line of endeavor. 
On occasion the criticism is raised that the findings of 
lowered performance in old age are not generalizable because 
the subject samples used in the research were not representative 
of the elderly portion of the population. It may be possible, 
it is argued, that the poor performance often found is a 
function of institutionalization or some other detrimental 
factor inherent in the immediate environmental circumstances. 
Schaie and Strother (1968a, 1968b) were able to test 
extensively 50 aged persons (25 males, 25 females; mean age 
76.5 years) who volunteered for a comprehensive research 
endeavor. All of these subjects were college graduates and 
had been associated with universities most of their lives. 
The testing revealed that some apparent cortical deterioration 
was extant among this group. Some decrement in flexibility 
(greater "rigidity") or response speed had occurred since 
middle adulthood. The maximum decrement, however, in comparison 
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with the younger reference group, was found on these variables: 
psychomotor speed, memory, and motor-cognitive rigidity. 
These results, obtained from an assessment of a carefully 
selected and presumably highly motivated sample of advanced 
age, lent strong support to the proposition that psychological 
age decrements reported in the literature cannot be criticized 
or refuted simply by referring to low motivation or to sampling 
artifacts. As Schaie and Strother emphasized, these persons 
reported generally satisfying environmental and social condi­
tions, all had a high level of education, and most held 
professional kinds of positions. Nevertheless, the state of 
psychological functioning of this group was at best at or 
slightly below the population average for young adults. Schaie 
and Strother suggested that these obvious decrements from 
peak performance were most likely related to some sort of 
physiological decrement, particularly of a sensory nature, and 
also to a general slowing down of response speed as well. 
Another one of the current views about changes accompanying 
the aging process is that older individuals tend to dissociate 
themselves from some part of their environment, particularly 
that necessitating some form of social interaction. In other 
words, the individual becomes a willing accomplice in the 
process of disengagement (Gumming and Henry, I96I). Many 
factors may lead to this withdrawal from the active social 
world; changes in health, feelings of energy, and mental 
sluggishness may all contribute to a limiting condition on 
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one's interpersonal relationships. Seen in this light, 
therefore, disengagement seems to be a process of cognitive 
and affective load-shedding, or perhaps an adaptive constric­
tion of psychological involvement in order to conserve energy 
and to maintain an optimum balance of demands and rewards. 
To extend this discussion a bit further, it may be 
conjectured that if poorer performance is characteristic of 
advanced age, perhaps the decrement could be due to this 
process of reducing one's interaction with others. This would 
lead to reduced feedback in social interaction situations, 
and thus one might slip back into egocentric-type speech. 
This process would appear to be the reverse of the improvement 
found in children, as discussed by Piaget (1950), George 
Herbert Mead (193^), and other theorists. In general, they 
suggested that peer-peer interactions provide opportunities 
for communication practice, for "verification" of one's 
perspective (Piaget, 1950), and that feedback in these practice 
experiences teaches children better and better communication 
habits. 
The disengagement process would also seem to be the reverse 
of the process concerning the interaction of environmental 
circumstances with developmental functions, as discussed by 
J. McV. Hunt (1961). According to his argument, the greater 
the variety of situations to which the child must accommodate 
his behavioral structures, the more differentiated and mobile 
these structures become. Extrapolating these notions to the 
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circumstances of the aged, perhaps their restricted 
environments (due to infirmity, expectations, or whatever) 
will eventuate in less differentiated and less mobile cognitive 
structures. Botwinick's (1966) suggestion to use "cautiousness" 
as an explanatory construct in interpreting age-related 
performance decrement is enhanced, by the ideas just presented. 
The theory of disengagement is not wholeheartedly 
acclaimed by all those involved with the psychology of aging. 
Thus far its value has been more heuristic than practical. 
It does appear to represent a plausible theoretical starting 
point for attempting to describe and explain psychological 
decrements occurring with advancing age. Nevertheless, with 
due credit given to Gumming and Henry (1961) for their explicit 
formulation of this theory, some acknowledgment should be 
accorded to that individual who first appeared to have 
recognized the disengagement process at work. In the autumn 
of his life G. Stanley Hall made the following observation: 
Now that the pressure of outer reality and 
its duties remit, attention tends more to 
focus on self and introspontaneity and 
mentation may take on a slightly dreamy 
character in that it is less under the 
domination of the objective environment, 
from which there is a new sense of freedom. 
The demand for rigorous proof of one's 
theorizations is somewhat less insistent 
and critics of them are felt to be lacking 
in insight. There is a slight shift from 
inductive to deductive thinking and as the 
senses begin to grow dim their verification 
of our speculations seems a trifle less 
imperative (Hall, 1922, p. ^ Ol). 
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OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION 
The present investigation represented an attempt to 
extend to the portion of the human life span labeled "aged" 
the existing theoretical constructs and research methodologies 
pertaining egocentrism, decentering, social interaction, 
and social communication. Thus far these concepts have been 
rather extensively studied in child, adolescent, and young 
adult samples, but only a few of the existing studies of the 
aged have been even tangentially related to these ideas. 
The seminal study for the present work was Cowan's (1966) 
investigation of egocentrism and social interaction in children. 
Cowan's design and procedures were adapted in such a way to 
make them more appropriate for adult subjects, both young and 
old. 
The major questions examined in the present investigation 
were these; 
(1) How do young adults and old adults compare on a 
measure of cognitive egocentrism, i.e., an individual measure 
of the ability to decenter or shift to other perspectives or 
points of attention? 
(2) What is the comparative performance of pairs of young 
adults .and pairs of old adults in a standardized social inter­
action or communication task? 
(3) Is egocentrism, as measured in individual subjects, 
related to performance of these subjects matched into pairs 
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in a communication dyad situation? 
A number of aspects of lesser importance in the social 
interaction situation were also examined extensively. 
To summarize, the basic intent of the present study was 
to obtain descriptive data from samples of young and old 
adults engaged in tasks identical or, in some respects, 
conceptually similar to those used extensively with young and 
older children. The primary theoretical notion underlying 
the present study, as well as the earlier studies with children, 
was that egocentrism is a pervasive mental construct inherently 
related to both intrapersonal and interpersonal cognitive 
functioning.. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects (8s) for this investigation consisted of two 
age groupings, young adults and old adults. The young adults 
were 4-6 students enrolled in introductory psychology classes 
at Iowa State University; no individuals older than 21 years 
of age were accepted for this group. The old adults were 
obtained from two sources. Sixteen were residents of a 
retirement community center located in Ames, Iowa; the remain­
ing l8 were residents of Ames living in the general community. 
This latter community-residing group was tested at weekly 
meetings of an organization for retired and elderly citizens. 
The criterion for inclusion in the old adult sample was age 
65 years or older. 
Table 1 summarizes the description of the ^  samples used 
in this study. 
Procedure and Test Materials 
Initially the Vocabulary subtest from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale was administered to all Ss. This instrument 
was intended to be used as a rough mental screening device; 
however, no Ss were eliminated from further participation in 
thQ study on the basis of these scores. The vocabulary scores 
were retained and used in the final data analysis as 
covariates. 
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Table 1, Description of subject samples 
Old Adults^ 
Retirement Community 
Characteristic Youne Adults Center Residents 
Sex: Males 28 2 6 
Females 18 Ik 12 
Age Range (years) 18 to 21 66 to 91 67 to 91 
Mean Age (years) 18.85 77.38 76.94 
Standard Deviation 0.97 10.22 7.21 
Mean Education Level 1^.41 11.08 
(years) 
3,96 Standard Deviation — 
&The mean age for the old adults combined was 77.15 
years (8D=7.46); the mean educational level for the combined 
group was 12,65 years (SD=3.5l). 
Cognitive egocentrism, or the ability to decenter, was 
measured with a variant of a task used by Piaget and Inhelder 
(1956) and Cowan (1966, 1967). The task, originally used 
with children, was adapted to make it more appropriate for 
adult Ss, Each S, tested individually, was seated at a table 
opposite to the investigator (E). A pictorial illustration 
of this arrangement appears in Figure 1, Lying on the table 
between S and E was a five-by-six matrix board on which 
appeared six large red dots arranged in a particular fashion. 
Directly in front of S was another board which had four 
smaller five-by-six matrices; each of these smaller matrices 
contained either* a replica or a variant of the red-dot 
arrangement of the.large matrix. The following instructions 
were given to S: "What I want you to do is carefully examine 
Figure !.. The Egocentrism Task 
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this large pattern between us. Then look at the four patterns 
directly in front of you; select the one which shows this 
large pattern ââ 1 see it on my side of the table. In other 
words, I want you to put yourself mentally in my position and 
pick out that arrangement which I see, I want, you to pick 
out my point of view. Do you understand what I want you to 
do?" If S gave indication that he did not understand, the 
instructions were repeated, S was also encouraged to repeat 
the instructions in his own words in order to insure complete 
understanding. 
There were ten of these items included in the Egocentrism 
Task. Thus each S received a score in the range from zero 
to ten. The ten test patterns appear in Appendix A. A copy 
of E's scoring sheet can be found in Appendix B. 
On the basis of the scores received on the Egocentrism 
Task 8s were matched into three kinds of pairs within each age 
group. 8s who received scores in the zero-to-five range consti­
tuted the "Lo" 8s; chose receiving scores in the six-to-ten group 
were the "Hi" 8s. Thus the three kinds of pairs derived from 
these two groups of 8s were Lo-Lo, Hi-Lo, and Hi-Hi,. There were no 
mixed-sex pairs: all were either male-male or female-female. 
In composing the Hi-Lo pairs, a difference of at least four had 
to exist between the scores of the members on each pair. 
Each of the pairs was then placed into the social inter­
action situation (this generally took place a few days after 
the initial egocentrism and WAIS Vocabulary scores .were 
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obtained). The basic intent of the Social Interaction (SI) 
Task was to look for ways by which 8s implied, or failed to 
iaply, that they were aware of each other's point of view. 
This task was essentially identical to that employed by 
Cowan (1966, 1967) in his studies with children. 
The two 8s in a matched pair were seated back-to-back 
at card tables. On each of the tables were Identical felt-
cloth "boards" which were arranged as four-by-four matrices-, 
A schematic representation of this situation appears in 
Figure 2, and a pictorial illustration of the task appears in 
Figure 3. 
The top eight squares on each board were colored yellow 
and the bottom eight squares were colored red. To the side 
of each 8 was a small table on which was placed a set of 16 
objects. Both 8s received identical sets of objects. A 
list of the objects included in these sets appears in Table 2. 
Yftllow m 
l^ b.ieGtsi 
Objects 
© 
Red Ye] Llow 
Figure 2, A bird's-eye view of the Social Interaction Task 
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Figure 3* The Social Interaction Task 
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Table 2. Objects employed in the Social Interaction Task 
1. yellow felt square 8. matchbook 
2. red felt square 9. blue poker chip 
3. small metal can 10. small red wire 
4. cardboard pattern. 11. large paper clip 
random shape #1 12. small paper clip 
5. cardboard pattern. 13. cuff link 
random shape #2 Ik. white magnetic tape clip 
6. cardboard pattern. 15. bolt 
random shape #3 & 16. penny 
7, DiDe cleaner 
^Illustrations of the three random shapes appear in 
Appendix C, 
It was assumed that the objects differed in their 
"codability", i.e., how easily they could be described to 
another person. Some of the objects were familiar items and 
thus easily labeled (e.g., penny, matchbook); some objects 
were of the same class or category but varied in one 
attribute (e.g., red and yellow felt squares, small and large 
paper clips)j some were assumed to be difficult to label or 
describe (e.g., tape clip, random shapes). 
The instructions to the pair of Ss were as follows: "For 
this task you may not turn around to look at your partner. 
What you are to do is take the objects you have and place 
them in the squares on the board in front of you. One 
object is to go in each square. The real objective, however, 
is that when you are finished, I want your boards to end up 
looking the same. OK, you may begin." The instructions 
were deliberately made to be ambiguous; "the same" arrangement 
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of objects was not defined any further. Essentially the only 
restriction put upon Ss was that they could not turn around to 
look at each other's work; nothing was said about verbal 
communication. The task was of such a nature that verbal com- •. 
munication had to be used in order to achieve the objective 
given to Ss in their instructions. 
The actions of Ss were noted by E during the course of 
the task. Also, the verbalizations of selected pairs were tape-
recorded, There were two principal measures. One was 
"communication efficiency," or the total number of the 16 
objects that were placed in identical cells in the Ss' respec­
tive boards. For scoring purposes "identical" was decided to 
be identical relative to each S's body (e.g., in the lower left-
hand corner relative to each S), According to Cowan's (1969) 
criterion, mirror images were counted as incorrect unless 
explicit recognition of this problem was made by both members 
of the pair. The other principal measure was the total time 
required by the pair to complete the task. The time interval 
began at the end of the formal instructions and ended when Ss 
agreed with each other that they were finished placing the 16 
objects to their satisfaction. Time was recorded without 
Ss' awareness of this fact. Other descriptive measures of 
the communication system which developed between the two Ss 
were also noted. These included the following: (a) the 
occurrence of metacommunication (discussion about how they 
were going to talk to each other) before starting to place the 
if7 
objects; (b) the manner of object placement (systematic, 
random, etc.); (c) the first objects to be placed by mutual 
agreement; (d) the last objects to be placed. A copy of E's 
scoring sheet for the SI Task can be found in Appendix D. 
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RESULTS 
The results of the WAIS Vocabulary subtest appear in Table 
3» As can be seen, the young adult (YA) mean score was higher 
than the mean score of the combined old adult (OA) group. 
This difference was significant (t = 2.59, df = 78; p < .01), 
The mean score on this subtest for the retirement-center OA 
group was 53«25 (SD = 11.25), and the mean score for the 
community-residing OA group was 46.44 (SD = 10.45). This 
difference did not reach significance (t = 1.77, df = 32). 
Table 3. Summary of WAIS Vocabulary subtest results 
Grout) Mean Standard Deviation 
Young Adults 55.35 8.20 
Old Adults 49.65 11.20 
The results of the Egocentrism Task are presented in Table 
If. The difference favoring the YA group on this ten-item test 
i 
was highly significant (t = 8.25, df = 78; p< .001). Looking 
at the OA sample alone, the mean score of the retirement-
center group was 4.88 (SD = 2.13); the community-residing 
group mean was 3.89 (SD = 3.23). This difference was non­
significant (t = 1.01, df = 32). 
Following the criteria stated earlier, Ss' performance 
on the Egocentrism Task permitted the formation of the following 
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Table h» Summary of Egocentrism Task results 
GrouT) Mean Score Standard Deviation 
Young Adults 6.33 3*66 
Old Adults ^.35 2.77 
numbers of pair combinations for the SI Task: Hi-Hi — 11 YA 
pairs and h OA pairs; Hi-Lo — 6 YA and 6 OA; Lo-Lo — 6 YA 
and 7 OA. 
The two variables of major interest in the SI Task were 
"communication efficiency," or the number of identical place­
ments of the l6 objects by each pair, and the time required 
to complete the task. A summary of the results on these two 
variables appears in Table 5; these results are presented 
graphically in Figures 4 and 5. 
Table 5. Summary of major Social Interaction Task results 
Pair 
Combination Grour» 
Mean Number 
Identical 
Placements 
Mean Time Required 
for Task Comple­
tion (seconds) 
Hi-Hi Young 13.82 285.1 
Old 12.00 512.5 
Hi-Lo Young 12.33 244.3 
Old 12.67 484.9 
Lo—Lo Young 15.50 212.0 
Old 8.86 576.7 
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Table 6. Analysis of variance: SI identical placement scores 
Source SS df MS F 
Age 88.5 1 88,5 3.33 
Pair Combinations 12.5 2 6,3 0.2^ 
Age X Pair Combinations 79.8 2 39.9 1.50 
WAIS Vocab. Covariate #1 0,1 1 0,1 0.00 
WAIS Vocab, Covariate #2 19.7 1 19.7 0.7^ 
Error 851.2 32 26,6 
Total 1051.8 39 
Note — Due to the regression analysis used, it was not 
possible to combine the two WAIS Vocabulary covariates 
into one effect. Thus, the first covariate refers to 
the higher Vocabulary score in each subject pair, 
and the second refers to the lower score. 
Table 6 presents the variance analysis of the SI 
identical-placement scores, and Table ? presents the analysis 
of variance of the time-requirement scores from the SI Task, 
These analyses indicated that the only significant effect was 
age in the time-requirement analysis: Old adults required 
more than twice the time to complete the task then did young 
adults. No other effect or interaction reached statistical 
significance. Thus, it is of importance to note that the 
three forms of pair combinations were not differentiated with 
regard to communication efficiency or time required to complete 
the SI Task. The mean scores for all YA pairs on identical 
placement and the time requirement were, respectively, 13.87 
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Table 7. Analysis of variance: Time required to complete 
SI Task 
Source SS df MS F 
Age 429,351 1 429,351 20.77* 
Pair Combination 10,097 2 5,048 0.24 
Age X Pair Combination 21,846 2 10,923 0.53 
WAIS Vocab. Covariate #1 10,677 1 10,677 0.52 
WAIS Vocab. Covariate #2 6,664 1 3,664 0.18 
Error 661,355 32 20,667 
Total 1 ,136,990 39 
*p < .001. 
and 255*39 (sees.); the comparable scores for all OA pairs 
were 10,9^ and 529*18 (sees.). 
Table 8 presents the intercorrelations among selected 
variables from the SI Task and the WAIS Vocabulary covariates. 
With regard to the two primary dependent variables, these 
correlations are in agreement with the analysis of variance 
results presented earlier: There was a substantial, significant 
correlation between the time-requirement scores and the age 
groups (older Ss performed this task considerably more slowly 
than young Ss), and there was a small, nonsignificant 
correlation between the identical-placements scores and age. 
As can be noted from the table, the two dependent variables 
intercorrelated lowly and at a nonsignificant level (-.20). 
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Table 8, Intercorrelations among selected Social Interaction 
Task variables and the WAIS Vocabulary covariates 
Measure i 2 3 ^ 
1. Age 
2. Identical Placements ,28 
3. Time Requirement -.71* -.20 
4. WAIS Vocab, Covariate #1 ,13 ,oV -»2h 
5. WAIS Vocab. Covariate #2 ,56* ,07 -.48* .46* 
Note - N = 40 
*P < .01. 
The moderately high correlation between age and the second 
vocabulary covariate is best accounted for by considering the 
substantial correlation between that covariate and the time-
requirement variable. The proportions of variance involved 
in these relationships are explained by the high correlation 
between the two variables common to them -- age and time. 
During the course of the SI Task with each pair of Ss, 
the investigator recorded several observations concerning the 
mode of operation employed by the pair. One such observation 
was concerned with the manner by the pair placed the objects 
on the squares in front of them. The most efficient strategy 
appeared to be one in which objects were placed in some 
sequential order, i.e., across rows or up and down columns. 
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This type of strategy eliminated the need to establish 
coordinates each time a new object was placed; each S under­
stood that each new object was to be placed in the cell adja­
cent to the cell in which the last object was placed. In 
contrast to this systematic strategy was a procedure used by 
some pairs that was essentially random: There was no 
relationship between the placement of one object and the 
placement of the next. Table 9 presents a tabulation of the 
Table 9. Frequency of employment of efficient object-place 
ment strategies 
Pair 
Combination 
Young 
Adults 
Old 
Adults Total Percentage 
Hi-Hi 7/11 2/h 9/15 ON
 
Hi-Lo 3/6 2/6 5/12 h2^ 
Lo—Lo V6 3/7 7/13 53^  
Total 14/23 7/17 
Percentage 61% hl% 
Note - Each fraction represents the number of pairs using an 
efficient strategy over the total number of pairs in 
that group. 
frequency of employment of these "efficient" (or systematic) 
strategies as opposed to any other kind of strategy. As can 
be noted, the pair combinations evidenced no systematic trend 
in the use of efficient Strategies, although young adults used 
them more frequently than old adults. When both age groups 
were pooled together, no systematic trend was found across the 
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three pair combinations with regard to the frequency of 
employment of efficient strategies (X^ = 1.00, df = 2). 
Another observation made was concerned with the occurrence 
of metacommunication before either S in a pair began placing 
objects in the cells. In other words, did Ss recognize that 
it was necessary to establish some sort of verbal communica­
tion system in order to solve this task, and, consequently, 
did they discuss this matter with each other before they set 
out placing the objects? Table 10 presents these results. 
Table 10. Frequency of occurrence of initial metacommunication 
Pair 
Combination 
Young 
Adults 
Old 
Adults Total Percentage 
Hi-Hi 4/11 3A 7/15 47^  
Hi-Lo V6 1/6 5/12 
Lo—Lo 6/6 2/7 8/13 62^  
Total 1V23 6/17 
Percentage 61^  35^  
îîote - Similar to Table % each fraction here represents the 
number of pairs in which metacommunication occurred 
before the placement of objects over the total number 
of pairs in that group. 
It can be seen that again no systematic relationship occurred 
across the pair combinations, but that considerably more YA 
pairs engaged in this preliminary communication than did OA 
pairs. When the age groups were collapsed together, still no 
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systematic trend was found across pair combinations with regard 
to the occurrence of this initial metacommunication 
(X^ = 1.09, df = 2). 
A final observation recorded during the course of the 
SI Task concerned the order in which each of the 16 objects 
were placed. It can be hypothesized that those objects which 
can be most easily labeled or verbally described would be 
placed first, and those objects which are most difficult to 
describe would be put off until last (when there are fewer 
degrees of freedom remaining in the matrix of cells). Table 
11 presents these observations. The observations in this 
table are pairs; that is, the data in each column represent 
the number of pairs who made that particular object as one 
of their first, middle, or last placements. As can be observed 
from the table, the yellow and red felt pieces were by far 
the most common first placements, and the can and the three 
random shapes were far and away the most frequent objects to 
be placed last. However, it is to be noted that the high 
frequency of final placement of the can is accounted for by 
the fact that the other 15 objects were initially contained 
in the can; thus, the can was, in most cases, the last object 
"available" for placement. 
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Table 11, Order of object-placement frequencies 
Placement Order^ 
Object First Middle Last 
yellow felt 2h Ik 2 
red felt 28 17 5 
can 1+ 12 2h 
random shapes (3) 10 63 h7 
pipe cleaner 5 31 h 
matchbook 14 2h 2 
poker chip 9 31 0 
red wire 2 30 8 
large paper clip 3 37 0 
small paper slip 2 34 k 
cuff link 8 31 1 
tape clip 1 30 ? bolt 1 35 
penny- 6 32 2 
^"First" indicates inclusion in one of the first three 
object placements; "Middle" indicates inclusion in one of the 
middle ten placements; "Last" indicates inclusion in one of 
the last three placements. These frequencies are summed over 
the total ^ 0 subject pairs. 
^The orders of placements for the three random shapes 
have been combined. Thus, these frequencies are three times 
the magnitude of those for the other objects. 
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DISCUSSION 
With regard to the three questions of major concern in 
this study, the data ha"^e provided the following information: 
(1) young adults scored significantly higher than old adults 
on a test of the abillt^y to decenter (or, in a reverse sense, 
young adults were lower than old adults on a measure of 
egocentrism); (2) the accuracy of performance of young adult 
pairs and old adult paisrs on a verbal communication efficiency 
task did not significan-^tLy differ, although old adults required 
twice the time to complete the task as did young adults; 
(3) pairs formed on the basis of their members' egocentrism 
scores differed neither systematically nor significantly in 
their performance on the communication efficiency task. 
Additional findings were that young adults tended more often 
than old adults to use efficient, systematic strategies in the 
communication task, that young adult pairs tended more often 
than old adult pairs to engage in some form of initial strategy 
discussion (metacommunicaitlon) , and that pair combinations 
formed on the basis of ladlvidual Ss' egocentrism scores 
produced no differential! results on any of the measures 
studied. Also, it was demonstrated that the objects used in 
the SI Task seemed to differ in difficulty of being labeled or 
described and/or the likelihood of being selected first for 
employment'in the task. 
Obviously this study did not provide a definitive 
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delineation of the factor called "egocentrism". The ten-item 
egocentrism test was similar to tests employed originally by 
Piaget and later by Cowan; these tests were designed to measure 
the ability of the child to shift perspectives, to "take the 
point of view of someone else." It is possible that this 
ability may be better regarded as some form of perceptual skill, 
or, in the case of adults and the elderly, perhaps the concepts 
of rigidity or disengagement are more useful. This kind of 
question calls for a factor analytic study cast into the 
cross-sequential model for developmental research proposed 
by Schaie (1965» Schaie & Strother, 1968c) and Baltes (1968). 
Nevertheless, it was demonstrated quite clearly in the present 
study that this Piagetian test of egocentrism, heretofore 
employed only with children, markedly differentiates groups 
of young and old adults. It is of interest to note that not a 
single elderly S in the present study obtained the full score 
of ten, while this was a frequent score among the young adults. 
(Only two old adults achieved a score of nine») The most 
frequent kind of error on the Egocentrism Task, for both young 
and old, was that in which the individual selected the pattern 
that was a replica of his own perspective (the pattern would 
have to be rotated 180 degrees to be correct). However, older 
Ss also tended to make many more errors that are best described 
as random, while this kind of error was essentially non­
existent in younger Ss. 
The finding that Ss' egocentrism scores were not related 
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to their performance in the SI Task merits further considera­
tion. As stated earlier, the combination of pairs of children 
on the basis of egocentrism scores produced marked effects in 
the social tasks of Cowan's studies (1966, 1967). Apparently, 
therefore, adults displaying a low level of decentering ability 
are not hindered by the same deficiency in such tasks as the 
communication dyad employed in the present study. Perhaps 
an adult's long experience in verbal communication situations 
is too powerful an effect to be significantly countered by 
poor decentering ability, • at least as the latter factor is 
measured in an individual setting. In the Egocentrism Task, 
in which S was requested to pick out the pattern illustrating 
the examiner's point of view, whatever response S gave was 
accepted without question. (It might be mentioned that many Ss 
looked up expectantly at the examiner after making a response, 
apparently hoping for some sort of confirmation.) In the 
SI Task, however, the verbal interaction quickly brought into 
J 
focus any conflict in viewpoints, and the following interchange 
generally resolved the disparity. This situation would seem 
to be similar to everyday interactions in social settings. 
It may be that, for the adult (whether young or old), the 
experience of many years in communicating with other persons 
develops basic abilities of recognizing another's point of view 
and of defending one's own point of view with logic and clarity. 
In situations where social interchange and correction do not 
take place, more primitive modes of functioning may be allowed • 
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to operate. 
The highly egocentric child, as opposed to an adult who 
scores poorly on a test of egocentrism, has not yet learned 
that other people are not as tolerant of his inconsistencies 
as he is himself. The nonegocentric child, on the other hand, 
is likely to perform well in the SI Task because of his 
comparatively more advanced stage of mental functioning and, 
consequently, because of his greater awareness of the workings 
of social interchange. It could follow that an adult, 
regardless of his performance on an individual test of 
egocentrism, has learned to rely on various forms of feedback 
from his receiver in order to assess the effectiveness of his 
communication. In contrast, an egocentric child has not yet 
learned to develop these dependencies on his communication 
partner, nor has he developed a concern over his communication 
effectiveness. 
This line of reasoning provides an explanation, however 
adequate, as to why an egocentrism measure obtained in an 
individual situation is related to the performance of a child 
in social situations, but not to that of an "egocentric" adult. 
To an egocentric child, these situations are not different in 
any important sense. The present study, in combination with 
similar studies with children, gives strong support to the 
notion that apart from the more commonly stressed affective 
side of social interaction, there is an important cognitive 
component. 
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The results of the SI Task appear to be In line with 
much of the bulk of gerontological research: Old adults, in 
comparison with young adults, perform at about the same level 
of accuracy but at a much slower pace. As Botwinick (1970) 
has pointed out in his recent discussion of "geropsychology," 
the older literature that emphasized increasing deficit with 
age in verbal learning and many other sorts of functioning / 
has been increasingly called to challenge. The basis of this 
challenge is the growing evidence indicating that the observed 
deficit may have been one of performance rather than something 
more basic to the individual, such as learning ability. The 
general technique used to test this challenge consists of 
varying stimulus presentation rates and comparing Ss under 
conditions varying in pace. The central idea behind this 
technique is that the commonly used rates of stimulus presenta­
tion unfairly impose performance limitations on the elderly, 
Botwinick (1970) has cited several recent studies that have 
supported this speed-performance notion. 
The present study was not directly concerned with learning 
ability, but it was concerned with performance in a situation 
where speed was not crucial in the completion of the task. 
(The time required to complete the task was recorded without 
the Ss' awareness of this fact.) It thus may be assumed that 
Ss worked at their natural, preferred "operating speeds," To 
speak in generalities, young Ss tended to attack the problem 
with great vigor and a sense of certainty as to how the task 
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vas to be achieved. In fact, a number of the younger Ss 
displayed what appeared to be impulsive behavior in their own 
placement decisions and in responding to the decisions made by 
their partners. This seemed especially true for the younger 
Lo~Lo Ss (note that these pairs recorded the fastest mean times 
to completion). The older S pairs, on the other hand, seemed 
far less certain as to what the task was all about and what 
was expected of them. They certainly were not "test wise,'" 
which the younger college S unquestionably were. (In consider­
ing the great time differential between the two groups, it is 
well to keep in mind that many of the college adults had 
taken part in several psychological experiments. For the most 
part, they constituted a well-trained group of research 
participants.) Thus, the behavior of the typical older pair 
could be characterized as cautious and uncertain. Furthermore, 
this indecisiveness was prominent not only in the initial 
stages of their work, but also it carried through to the last 
of the 16 object placements. They never seemed quite sure what 
the task was all about. 
The slow responding of older Ss is suggestive of the 
response characteristic of "cautiousness," discussed and 
researched in recent years by Botwinick (I966, 1969) and 
Silverman (1963). This factor is essentially one of disinclina­
tion toward making decisions and taking actions. Botwinick 
(1969) has further suggested that what at first may appear to 
be cautiousness in actuality may be an interest in avoiding the 
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need to make decisions in the first place (and the need to 
avoid making decisions in the first place may be conceptualized 
as an aspect of disengagement). At any rate, the older Ss' 
general approach to the SI Task in the present study was 
certainly conservative and cautious. Nevertheless, the author 
believes it is Important to underscore the fact that, despite 
the two markedly different approaches to the problem displayed 
by the two age groups, the objective performances were 
essentially the same. 
The behavioral patterns established by individual pairs 
in the SI Task were, for the most part, complex interchanges 
that defied objective recording. Certainly the peculiarities 
and unique aspects of the communication system established 
between the members of a pair were not reflected in such 
measures as "total number of identical object placements" and 
"time required for completion of task." Because of the 
behavioral richness existing in interactions such as those 
occurring in this study, it may be worthwhile to describe a 
number of specific observations taken from individual pairs. 
It is. hoped that such comments will provide greater insight 
into the kinds of behaviors displayed. These observations have 
been listed by number, but the listing is not intended to 
imply that these comments constitute the totality of unique 
behaviors exhibited. The following are only some of the more 
notable incidental observations recorded by the investigator. 
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(1) One pair of older Ss decided to arrange the objects 
in the cell rows according to categories of objects. 
The categories employed were "paper things," 
"metal things," "red and white things", and "odds 
and ends." This strategy produced a low score 
because a check was not made to ascertain which objects 
were in which cells within each row. Only these 
groups of objects were discussed, never individual 
objects. 
(2) A few members of the older pairs appeared to get 
quite upset with their partners. This was typically 
due to their partners' slowness, lack of feedback 
comments (such as "OK," "I understand you," etc.), 
incomprehension of instructions, and refusal to 
place objects in corresponding places. One pair of 
older male ^s came to the realization that they did 
not agree on several of their placements. One of 
the men suggested to his partner to change his in 
order that correspondence would be achieved. The 
partner offered the counter suggestion that he 
(the first man) change his instead. Both sat silently 
and stubbornly after that exchange, and the needed 
changes were never made. 
(3) Several instances of "verbal pointing" occurred in 
both young and old pairs. This amounted to making 
gestures in the air with one's hands or giving 
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vague, nondlrectional instructions, Flavell (1966) 
and Glucksberg and Krauss (1967) have commented on 
the frequency of the verbal-pointing phenomenon in 
young children when addressing a listener not 
visible. The present study suggested that it is not 
uncommon in adults as well. A number of 8s employed 
elaborate hand gestures to "describe" the various 
random shapes to their partners. One older female S 
often held up an object over her shoulder and asked 
her partner: "Do you have one of these?" or "Is 
this the one you mean?" Other representative comments 
were the following: "Take the piece with the 
horizontal line on the edge....on the edge"if "Put 
it right down there. !' 
The investigator gained the impression that older Ss, 
as a rule, found it more difficult to describe many 
of the objects than did younger 8s.' Younger adults 
seemed to be much more able to produce a verbal label 
which would be sufficient for partners to quickly 
recognize the referent object. Furthermore, older 
Ss tended to take greater pains in describing each 
object in elaborate (and generally unnecessary) 
detail. This, of course, partially accounted for 
the much longer time needed by older pairs to complete 
the task. Younger pairs engaged in far less discus­
sion of the task in general and the objects in 
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particular; these people appeared to be more certain 
that their partners understood the strategy and the 
referents, 
(5) Older Ss appeared to be more concerned that both 
members of the pair took part in the decision making. 
Frequently they insisted that each member alternate 
in deciding where to place the next object. In 
contrast, younger pairs often allowed one person to 
dominate and make all decisions; this procedure was 
generally the fastest and most efficient. (One pair 
of older women spent a considerable amount of time 
arguing as to whose turn it was to make the next 
decision.) 
(6) A number of older pairs held the idea that the task 
of "making the boards end up looking the same" 
required that each object also had to be oriented 
in a certain way within each cell on the matrix. 
This, of course, also tended to consume much more 
time. Concern about within-cell orientation of 
objects was displayed by none of the young adult 
pairs. 
(7) The labels supplied to many of the objects were 
intriguing and, in many cases, surprisingly effective. 
This held true especially for the random shapes. 
For example. Shape #1 (see Appendix C) was occasion­
ally labeled a "king's crown," and Shape #2 even more 
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frequently was called a "staircase." On one occasion 
Shape #2 was called a "bat." Shape #3 was never 
supplied with a label; it was usually placed after 
the other two were accounted for. It is interesting 
to note that most all pairs, both young and old, were 
able to place successfully all three random shapes. 
The performance of one of the older female Ss 
(a "Hi" S) suggested that egocentric behavior was 
not necessarily limited to those who scored low on 
the test of egocentrism. This woman had several 
years of graduate education, was a former university 
faculty member, and appeared to be exceptionally alert. 
She was paired with a woman of considerably less 
education and general ability (according to the WAIS 
Vocabulary scores) and whom she knew very well. In 
describing the random shapes to her Lo partner, this 
Hi S employed such descriptive comments as the 
following: "This strange piece has two rather acute 
angles — oh, about 75 degrees in each. And this 
other piece has two angles on the side opposite the 
right angle, and these are about 120 degrees each." 
If the ability to decenter implies that the individual 
recognizes the informational needs of his partner 
and acts accordingly, then this particular Hi S was 
behaving in a decidedly egocentric manner. 
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The complete transcription of the recorded dialog from 
a young adult Lo-Lo pair engaged in the SI Task appears in 
Appendix E. 
The incidental finding in this study of a significant 
difference favoring young adults over old adults on the WAIS 
Vocabulary measure deserves further comment, Longitudinal data 
(e.g., Bayley & Oden, 1955; Owens, 1966) generally indicate a 
maintenance or even an increase with increasing age in 
vocabulary and other stored-information kinds of abilities. 
Cross-sectional studies, comparing groups of young adults with 
groups of older adults, have frequently demonstrated higher 
performance on vocabulary tests by older Ss (cf. Fox & Birren, 
1950; Kamin, 1957; Reed & Reitan, 1963). Cross-sectional 
studies have not been uniformly in agreement, however. Riegel 
(1959) found that a young group (mean age around 19) had a 
higher mean vocabulary score than an older group (over 65). 
The reason for the significant difference favoring the younger 
group in the present study can be accounted for by a. number of 
factors. The most salient factor appears to be the low scores 
of the community-residing old adults. An examination of the 
scores reveals that the retirement-center group performed 
more nearly like the young adults than did the community 
residers. The investigator gained the general impression that 
the members of the retirement-center group- were generally 
more able than the community-residing group. The difference in 
educational level, of course, also suggested this possibility. 
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The Initial ability level of the individual appears to be a 
crucial factor in the maintenance of ability over the life 
span. At least two studies (Birren & Morrison, 1961; Foulds 
& Raven, 1948) have demonstrated that, at least into the 
middle of the seventh decade of life, the initially more able 
person continues to be more able than his contemporaries of 
similar age. Other factors contributing to this vocabulary 
difference are likely to be the unrepresentativeness of the 
young adult group, qualitative educational differences between 
the two age groups, and the restrictions of the Vocabulary 
subtest of the Wechsler scale. 
As a final note on the present study, a comment should be 
made concerning the representativeness of the S samples used. 
It would appear that all research in psychology, regardless of 
the phylum under study, suffers from this problem. In human 
gerontological research, however, problems of sample representa­
tiveness are amplified to seemingly monumental proportions. 
What, for example, is the typical 80-year-old sample like? 
[At a recent conference on life-span psychology the implication 
was made in one paper that the typical 80-year-old human being 
is dead (Comalli, 1969)^  Riegel and his associates (1967) have 
illustrated quite convincingly that the composition of samples 
of old adults chaqges systematically in test-retest situations. 
The initially less able tend to drop out and be unavailable 
for retests; consequently, the more able are over-represented 
in the higher age brackets. It is impossible to determine the 
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extent of the dropout problem in studies such as the present, 
but it may be assumed to exist at least to a comparable extent. 
The samples for the present study were obtained on the 
basis of expediency only. In this respect, this study is 
different than the great majority of gerontological research 
endeavors. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that 
expediency generates several obvious, and probably several not 
so obvious, questions. To list a few: Ss' level of health 
and its effect upon test performance; geographic stability 
and its relation to S availability; the relationship between 
coopérâtiveness (or the lack of it) and volunteerism in 
elderly Ss; differences among persons residing in institutions, 
retirement homes, and the general community; and the uneven-
ness of aged individuals in functioning (i.e., the measured 
extent of deficit is a function of the specific abilities 
assessed)., Obviously, the items in the preceding list are 
neither orthogonal nor exhaustive. 
One more question suggests itself: What effect does the 
age of the investigator have upon the results of testing 
people of greatly different ages? 
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APPENDIX A 
TEST PATTERNS FOR EGOCENTRISM TASK 
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Pattern 1 Pattern 2 
• 
• 
• •• 
• UlLLL 
Pattern 3 Pattern V 
Pattern 5 Pattern 6 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
Pattern 7 
• • 
Pattern 8 
Pattern 9 Pattern 10 
Figure 6. Test patterns employed in the Egocentrism Task 
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APPENDIX B 
EXAMINER'S SCORING SHEET FOR EGOCENTRISM TASK 
8^ -
TASK 1 
Date 
Subject** Nnae Age Sex: M F 
Score Type: Hi Lo 
Pattern 1: 
Pattern 2: 
Pattern 3; 
Pattern 4; 
Pattern 5: 
Pattera 6: 
Pattern 7: 
Pattern 8: 
Pattern 9: 
Pattern 10: 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
CoBBMnte: 
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APPENDIX C 
THREE RANDOM SHAPES EMPLOYED IN SOCIAL INTERACTION TASK 
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SHAPE #2 
SHAPE #3 
Figure 7. The three random shapes employed in the Social 
Interaction Task 
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APPENDIX D 
EXAMINER'S SCORING SHEET FOR SOCIAL INTERACTION TASK 
Date __________________ 
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SOCIAL mCESACriON TASK 
Subjects: and Age: Young 
Old 
Sex: M - M F - F Condition: Hi-Rl HI-Xa 1a-XA 
First S to speaks ________________________ 
IfetaeomBninlcation : 
S suggesting plan of oj^ation: _________________________ Both? 
Left-right orientation: 
Up-down orientation: 
Orientation of board relative to other S,'6 body: 
Metocca: At beginning _______ After starting placements None _ 
Placement of objects: Systematic _______________________________ 
Random _______________________________ 
Other • 
First objects to be placed: ___________ _____________ __________ 
Last objects to be placed: ____________ ______________ ___________ 
Drainant 8 s ' 
Made all placement decisions? _______________ 
Alternating plaçaient decisions? ____________ 
Total tine elapsed: Number of identical placements: 
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APPENDIX E 
SAMPLE DIALOG FROM SOCIAL INTERACTION TASK 
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(The following is the dialog that occurred between two young 
females in a Lo-Lo pair. The Ss are identified by number.). 
2. Um, Yeh, okay, I see. 
1. We're supposed to end up exactly the same. 
2. Okay. 
1. Why don't we put the felt on first. That's what I have 
on top, 
2. Okay, whereabouts? 
1. Umm — put the red block — 
2. One down or one coming up? Okay. 
1, Put the red on the red felt and the gold on the gold felt 
in the corners. 
2, Okay, and then do we put the red felt on the red in the 
corners? 
1. Okay. That's fine with me. And the gold straight up in 
the right hand corner above. Do you want it in the upper 
or lower space up there? The lower just like in the 
bottom? 
2. Yeh. 
1. Okay, then I've got some pieces of cardboard, I've got 
three pieces. 
2. Uh huh. 
1. One of them looks — well — two of them look alike — no 
not really — but ... 
2, Yeh, I know what you mean. 
1. Yeh, well — (giggle). 
2. Put the tallest one, the one with the chunk on the side — 
the highest one, 
1. Yeh. 
2. Okay, the one that has the tallest point. 
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1. Yeh, that's fine, 
2, Okay, 
1. Is that the one that is branching off to the right? or 
to the left? 
2. To the left, 
1, Okay let's put that one right next to our red piece, I 
mean, well this will make it real easy, 
2, Down on the bottom? 
1. Yeh, at the bottom, the second square to your right. And, 
then put the one that is a right corner, that has three 
deals coming out of it — do you understand what I'm 
talking about? 
2. Wait a minuteI 
1, You've got your steps kind of going out on it. And, they 
are — oh boy, this is kind of difficult to describe, 
Umm — the other one is, well, more symmetrical, you know? 
The steps are more symmetrical — 
2, Right I 
1, Put that one in the corner, your, left hand corner on the 
bottom. On the red felt and put the other one in the 
third space. Okay? 
2, All right, 
1, Now it's your turn, 
2, It is — we have another one too. Isn't there? I've got 
three of them, 
1, Yeh, I've got that other one right next to the piece of 
red felt, 
2, Oh, you just put them all on the bottom, 
1, Right, Simpler that way, 
2, All right. 
1, Instead of any definite pattern. 
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2. Okay — do you want to take the match next? 
1* Okay, where do you want to put that? 
2, Let's put it up right next to the gold piece. 
1. Okay, 
2. And, then the pipe cleaner. 
1. Okay. 
2, Put that next to the matches. 
1. Okay — umm, the poker chip, mine is blue — let's put 
that next to the pipe-cleaner. 
2. Okay. Now we got two rows to go — right? 
1. Two what? 
2. Rows. 
1. Yeh, two rows. I'm sorry I misunderstood you. 
2. All right. 
1. What about putting the — now we've got two paper clips — 
Let's put just for variety, let's put one on the red and 
one on the gold. Let's start a new row over to our right 
again. 
2. Uh huh, 
1. And put the big one on the red and the little one up on 
the gold. 
2. Okay. 
1. Then we've got a cuff linkI 
2. Umm. 
1. And — I don't know if this is a screw or — do you see 
what I mean? 
2. Yeh. 
1. Well, let's put the cuff link first next to the big paper 
clip, and that screw dealy or whatever it is next to that. 
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To the smaller one? 
Okay — your choice. 
Okay, that little wire or whatever it is. 
That red — Oh, okay, 
Yeh, let's put that on the gold right next to the screw, 
Umm — you're putting that — I thought that the screw — 
umm okay that's fine. On the .gold? 
Yeh. 
Uh — 
Where did you put the screw? 
I put the screw on the third — well, you know our red 
blocks? 
You put it on the red — 
Yeh. 
— and I put the cuff link on the red. Okay. 
OhI I see — do you want to change? 
I'll change — I put the cuff link on the gold — right? 
Well, I put mine down on the red part. All on the red 
part. 
Both of them? Ohhhl 
Yeh — I started another row, in other words. 
Okay. 
And then I pilt cuff link — well let ' s see — my second 
row consists of a large paper clip, a cuff link, that 
screw and then now you said to put the wire down. 
No, let's put the wire up by the small — 
Okay. 
— paper clip. Okay? Now the penny — 
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1, Where do you want that? 
2, Let's put it up by the wire, 
1, Okay. 
2. And then, put that little white thing — let's put it on 
the last block of red. 
1. Okay. Umm, do you want to put this pan on it too — 
(giggle) . 
2. Yeh — put it on — (giggle). 
